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 As is apparent from discussion elsewhere in this paper, the forging of the post-Washington 
consensus derives primarily from the initiative taken within the World Bank and from the 
microeconomics of market imperfections. One consequence is that the new consensus has 
opened or reopened divisions and tensions between the World Bank and the IMF. These had 
previously emerged in the 1980s with encroachment across one another’s concerns, the IMF 
with the supply-side and the World Bank with stabilisation. The old consensus, in the form of 
neo-liberal postures, had provided for a compromise between the two institutions, with 
common agreement on austere macroeconomic policy and reliance upon the market at the 
microeconomic level.  
 
 Previously, despite the division of responsibilities between the two institutions, their 
analyses did not remain completely divorced from one another. There are good logical 
reasons for this. If the IMF is concerned with macroeconomics and the short-run, and the 
World Bank with the microeconomics and the long run, there is a case for integrating the two. 
Where does the micro become macro and the short the long run? Of course, these connections 
have long raised problems, often overlooked or set aside, within economics. But they are 
particularly pertinent in the context of the old consensus and its pre-occupation with stability 
and growth. For only by addressing them is it possible to relate stabilisation in the short run to 
growth in the long run as well as the co-ordination of the policies of the respective 
Washington institutions. In other words, the issue is to what long-run growth path is 
stabilisation attaching itself. 
 
 This is an issue that provides the backdrop to the whole of this paper although, at times, it 
is brought explicitly to the fore. We begin in section 2 with the macroeconomics of the old 
Washington consensus, most notably associated with models of financial programming, 
originating with and evolving from Polak's (1957) simplest of treatments. In section 3, we 
provide an overview of the heavy criticisms that financial programming has attracted. In 
general, however, these have not provided a close examination of the relationship between the 
model of the short and long runs attached, respectively, to the IMF and the World Bank. This 
is despite an attempt to integrate the two approaches from within the Washington consensus 
itself, most notably in the papers of Khan and Montiel (1989 and 1990) and Polak (1990). 
But, in coming to terms with the old consensus, this is particularly important for, as will be 
shown in section 4, the analytical postures adopted by the World Bank and IMF, taken 
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together and integrated, are essentially worthless on their own technical grounds. This 
conclusion arises out of the implicit relationship between short-run stabilisation and long-run 
growth. Effectively, stabilisation has been unwittingly designed around a zero growth rate or 
an unstable growth path, neither of which, surely, is acceptable as the basis for policy making 
for any, let alone a developing, economy.2 It is essentially worse than useless in dealing with 
the twin goals of growth and stability. If the IMF is concerned with the short-run and 
stabilisation, and the World Bank with the long run and growth, the presumption that their 
respective activities can be treated as independent of one another or mutually reinforcing, is 
totally fallacious. 
  
 From an analytical point of view, the merging of responsibilities around stabilisation has 
necessarily given the World Bank the intellectual lead in establishing the post-Washington 
consensus, a stance that does not appear to be readily accepted by the IMF. For the new 
consensus is made of broader stuff than the monetarist leanings associated with the IMF's 
financial programming. Its macroeconomics is based upon the new Keynesian micro-
foundations and focuses upon market imperfections which, when taken together or projected 
onto the macroeconomy, yield results of a Keynesian quality.3 Prices might not adjust to clear 
markets, excess demand can co-exist with excess capacity, developing economies are 
particularly prone to structural features and institutions corresponding to market 
imperfections which impede adjustment and stabilisation and which warrant state 
intervention, less severe macro-policy, and a considered and efficient balance between 
multiple policy objectives.  
 
Yet, the IMF’s approach to financial programming has increasingly evolved to embrace 
ever more complex modelling. As will be shown in section 5, in analytical terms if not so 
readily in its financial programming, the IMF already has the potential to incorporate the 
insights and thrust of the macroeconomics attached to the new consensus. In effect, the 
analytical contradictions of the old consensus, which were never exposed let alone addressed, 
can be set aside by the new consensus to which models underlying IMF financial 
programming can be interpreted as converging. In particular, the extent of the IMF’s 
commitment to, and acceptance of, the new consensus will depend upon the extent to which it 
frees itself from obsessive pre-occupation with financial targets at the expense of growth and 
other non-financial objectives. For it is only in its analytical origins in the Polak model and in 
its continuing commitment to financial programming that IMF macroeconomics is obstructed 
from embracing the post-Washington consensus. In terms of the old joke, wherever the IMF 
is going, it would have done better to have started from somewhere else! 
 
In short, the analytical divisions over macroeconomics between the IMF and the World 
Bank are not so great as has been supposed with the emergence of the post-Washington 
consensus. It is more a matter of apparent differences of objectives, at least in theory. Nor 
does the new consensus come to terms properly with the relationship between stabilisation 
and growth, and the concluding remarks point to alternative approaches to such issues. 
 
                                                          
2 For those unconcerned with the derivation of the technical results in Section 4, it suffices to read the opening 
and closing paragraphs. The mathematical derivations are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
3 For an account of the content and emergence of the new Keynesian macroeconomics in the context of labour 




2. MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
 
 Stabilisation and structural adjustment have been dominated by IMF financial 
programming. As a result, it might be thought that there would be a well-established and 
explicit account of its features and analytical underpinnings. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. As is observed in a paper intended to elaborate, “theoretical aspects of the design of 
fund-supported adjustment programs”, IMF (1987, p. 1), financial programming: 
 
is based largely on oral tradition. There is surprisingly little readily accessible 
written material on its theoretical underpinnings, in particular, on the 
interaction among policy measures in achieving the ultimate objectives … 
Since the early 1970s, however, the conception and the structure of adjustment 
programs have gradually evolved and expanded. 
 
 The final sentence of the quote refers to the evolution of the analytical framework attached 
to financial programming. This raises a number of questions, which will be dealt with in turn. 
First, what was the starting point for financial programming? Second, what motivated it to be 
changed? Third, what is the content of those changes? 
 
 As is well known, the initial economic model attached to financial programming is 
associated with Polak (1957).4 The formal details of the model are laid out in Appendix 1, 
together with the results drawn upon below. The principles involved are relatively simple. 
First, there is a stable relationship between the supply of money and the level of nominal 
income determined by expenditure – the more money we have, the more we spend. Second, 
expenditure can either be made on domestically produced goods or on imports. Third, if the 
latter exceed exports, then there will be a balance of trade deficit, which will have to be 
covered by an outflow of foreign reserves at the expense of the domestic money supply (and 
inflow for balance of trade surplus). Fourth, with a new level of money supply established, 
the whole process can be repeated. One immediate implication is that increases in the 
domestic supply of credit will lead to an increase in imports and a corresponding outflow of 
foreign reserves restoring the overall money supply to its initial level. 
 
 An important aspect of the model is that it leaves open how the level of nominal income is 
divided down into prices and output. In the purest form of monetarism, subject to random 
shocks, all markets work perfectly and instantaneously. Consequently, the domestic level of 
output is at capacity, and the domestic price level cannot change (for a regime of fixed 
exchange rates as was presumed to prevail at that time) since otherwise different prices would 
prevail on domestic and foreign markets. As a result, all increases in domestic credit 
instantaneously leak out of the economy in the form of loss of reserves. Only a certain amount 
of money holdings are required by the domestic economy relative to domestic output. The 
Polak model is not so extreme. Implicitly, it allows for domestic and foreign prices to diverge 
temporarily from one another and for the division of nominal income between output and 
prices to be left undetermined.  
 
                                                          
4 Polak was Director of the Research Department at the IMF from 1958 to 1979. 
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 In practice, this opens the way for IMF discretion in deciding what the level of output is 
liable to be for a country undergoing stabilisation. As a conservative judgment is usually 
made, this leads to austere policies in terms of government expenditure. Ultimately, the IMF 
prescriptions are based on the capacity to pay for imports, whether from exports of goods or 
inflows of capital. As shown in Appendix 1, an economy is subject to what might be termed 
an import multiplier. If it has an import ratio of 25 per cent, for example, then domestic 
output must be tied to a level at four times the capacity to pay for imports. 
 
 For Polak (1997), writing in retrospect, the key feature of the model is its simplicity. This, 
in turn, is motivated by the lack of data other than banking and trade statistics, and the focus 
upon a single policy variable that could be controlled – the level of domestic credit creation. 
It might be thought that such a rationale is extremely weak. To deploy a medical analogy, it is 
as if to treat a patient with a broken leg with penicillin because this is the only medicine 
available with which to affect temperature which can at least be measured accurately. 
However, turning to the second question listed above of the motives for model evolution, one 
factor is the availability of improved data and policy instruments.  
 
 But there are other factors as well. The initial model is highly aggregated. Levels of 
expenditure, sources of output, flows of finance can all be disaggregated into distinct 
components, both within and between the public and private sectors. Each of these can be 
examined on the basis of the influence of a greater range of explanatory factors – introducing 
the rate of interest, for example, in capital flows and expenditure decisions.5 In addition, 
economic theory can be more fully deployed, itself subject to change, to examine the core 
relationship between nominal income, output and prices at various levels of disaggregation. 
Finally, the initial model needed to be modified in the light of changed international 
circumstances and changed objectives – not least with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates and the rising incidence of hyperinflation.  
 
 It is not difficult to chart the process by which the initial model has evolved. For 
Rhomberg and Heller (1977, p. 4): 
 
The demand for money, it is argued, depends on a relatively small number of 
economic factors, and the effects of economic changes on the demand for 
money are therefore easy to assess because they can operate only through one 
or several of these few factors. A similar argument can be made with respect to 
the determination of the supply of money … The apparent simplicity of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments is, however, deceptive. Even 
for many purposes the demand for money can be conveniently expressed as a 
function of a small number of variables, it is still just as much the resultant of 
all the influences that come to bear on the economy, as are national income 
and expenditure. Again, domestic credit, which is often taken as being 
determined exogenously, may in fact be systematically influenced by factors 
determining the demand for money or by some of the events whose monetary 
effects are being examined. These considerations do not invalidate the 
monetary approach; they merely draw attention to the possibility that it will be 
                                                          
5 Polak and Argy (1971), for example, adopt a simple version of the IS/LM/BP model. 
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seen, on further examination, to be not quite so superior in terms of simplicity 
of application as had first been thought. 
 
 This passage has been worth quoting at length since it shows, from a book entitled The 
Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, issued by the IMF, that there is more than a 
lingering commitment to the approach even though it is effectively acknowledged that 
everything in the economy depends upon everything else so that, in principle, there is no 
rationale for excessive emphasis upon monetary factors. A decade later, there is an explicit 
distancing from the taint of monetarism and dogmatism, IMF (1987, p. 2): 
 
As will be stressed in the description of the body of theory underlying Fund-
supported adjustment programs, the Fund’s approach to program design is 
eclectic. The paper will, it is hoped, serve to dispel the notion that these 
programs are all based on a particular view of the economy or on the 
convictions of a single school of economic thought. That money and monetary 
policy play an important role in determining balance of payments outcomes, 
and therefore clearly also in the design of adjustment programs, does not make 
Fund-supported programs necessarily “monetarist” in character. 
 
 Within the next decade, Schadler et al (1995) are reporting the need for more extensive 
intervention in stabilisation policy because of lags in responses and underlying distortions in 
economies precluding adjustment.6 Consequently, conditionality has been extended beyond 
demand restraint to include supply-side measures. With some resistance from some IMF 
Board members a research agenda is set for, p. 50: 
 
How the combination of initial conditions, external environment, 
macroeconomic and policies, and key rigidities in the economy affected the 
path of saving, investment, and output during the adjustment phase. In light of 
the forward-looking nature of investment decisions, the study would have to 
examine the credibility and medium-term consistency of policies. 
 
 The theory of the monetary approach to the balance of payments has formed a central part 
of stabilisation and adjustment within the old consensus. Consequently, the theory offers 
particular ways of understanding how developing economies work in and of themselves and 
through their interaction with other economies. However, the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments itself evolved continuously since the Polak days, which sought to 
establish that excessive expansion in domestic credit could result in macroeconomic 
imbalances, whether this be due to increased demand for imports or to excessive demand for 
liquidity as in standard IS/LM representations of the Keynesian system and liquidity trap. 
 
 A number of separate influences can be identified as having influenced the evolution of 
macroeconomic stabilisation.7 The first has been to tie the theory more consistently to what 
                                                          
6 See also Khan et al (eds.) (1991), especially Khan et al (1991, p. 9) who, for reasons discussed at greater length 
in section 5, conclude: 
 
As evident from the papers in this volume, all these factors combine to make today’s models 
quite different in both form and substance from those of yesterday. 
 
7 Taylor (1987, p. 7) sets out the goals of stabilisation policies as described here. 
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can be termed ‘general equilibrium considerations’. This itself has several components, 
discussed below. Second, it has been complemented by a neo-liberal supply-side approach 
(reliance on the market where possible) and, thirdly, by a neo-liberal demand-side stance 
(austerity in macro-targets). In targeting, some sensitivity is shown towards country-specific 
conditions with inflation, for example, being reduced in light of historical experience rather 
than inflexible and universally imposed level. A tolerable rate might range from something 
close to zero to 100 per cent. In addition, politically sensitive issues, such as income 
distribution and state provision must conform to local economic and political constraints. 
Within such bounds, the policy measures that bring about such changes are austerity (fiscal), 
exchange rate (devaluation), monetary tightness (interest rate), liberalisation (trade, 
commodity prices, etc.) and incomes policy (wage, subsidy, transfers etc.). 
 
 Based on general equilibrium considerations the Washington consensus has divided 
macroeconomic stabilisation programmes into demand-side and supply-side policies, with the 
exchange rate falling in between. External debt management is also included as part of 
stabilisation programmes. Fiscal and monetary policies are subsumed under the demand-side, 
while trade liberalisation, removal of price controls and subsidies and financial and public 
sector reforms come under the supply-side. Equilibrium is sought via measures that restrain 
aggregate demand and/or stimulate aggregate supply and stabilise the economy in the short-
run and stimulate growth in the medium to long term as set out in Crocket (1981). The policy 
targets are the inflation rate, the balance of payments and economic growth. The instruments 
include domestic credit, the exchange rate and the interest rate. Any subsequent deviation 
from target variables, therefore, indicates external or internal disequilibrium: the former being 
the disequilibrium between imports and exports, that is, the current account deficit; and the 
latter the imbalance between government spending and revenue, the budget deficit (Khan and 
Knight (1981, 1982, and 1985). 
 
 Some of the general equilibrium considerations, taking the simple form of accounting 
identities, have been prominent in the design of stabilisation policies, especially for those 
countries with high inflation rates, an overvalued exchange rates and excess domestic credit, 
particularly to the public sector. Crudely put, the policy implications are to devalue the 
nominal exchange rate to achieve export competitiveness, restrain domestic credit to control 
inflation and simultaneously achieve real exchange rate depreciation. If this succeeds, there 
will be an improvement in current account deficits as exports rise and imports fall.8 To a large 
extent, as identities, these aspects are independent of the theoretical content with which they 
are endowed, even if, in practice, it has often been simplistic. Even so, such accounting 
identities are not entirely analytically neutral, despite being tautologous within their own 
frame of reference, for, they do incorporate a particular structural understanding of the 
economy depending on how the latter is disaggregated into separate components that are 
added together to form the identities. In addition, they necessarily suppose that certain 
variables are contemporaneous with one another, since they have to be added at one and the 
same time. Thus the use of identities in stabilisation theory presupposes assumptions about 
both structuring and sequencing between variables. Such issues are of paramount importance, 
but they tend to be overlooked as conventional wisdom in model building becoming 
standardised and adopted unquestioningly. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
8 This process is aided by devaluation and a fall in demand for imported goods. This simultaneous relationship 
between external and internal resource gaps can be demonstrated as follows: Z - X = (I - S) + (G - T).  
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 In the conventional model an internal disequilibrium caused either by a shortfall in savings 
or tax revenue is reflected by a disequilibrium in the current account and vice versa. Shortfalls 
in savings (due to a high level of consumption) can be financed by external borrowing, but no 
capacity is created to pay back. On the other hand, if external borrowing is used directly to 
finance investment, it is sustainable if the marginal returns from it exceed the cost of 
borrowing. Those responsible for stabilisation have generally pessimistic judgements about 
the capacity of developing economies to generate such a return in the short-term. Specifically, 
external borrowing above assumed sustainable levels is not an option in stabilisation 
programmes, simply because reduction of debt burden itself has become an overriding 
objective. Therefore, the short-term feasible policy in the typical stabilisation programme is to 
reduce aggregate consumption and investment, commonly referred to as aggregate demand or 
absorption.  
 
 The debate on stabilisation policies rests on identifying the primary causes of spiralling 
inflation and balance of payments disequilibria. The orthodox response to inflation is to 
reduce aggregate demand. Under the assumption of the law of one price, a fall in aggregate 
demand leads to a decline in the price of non-tradable goods and services. It follows that 
prices of tradable goods and services rise relative to non-tradable, leading to a resource shift 
into export and import-substituting sectors. Devaluation facilitates this process while higher 
interest rates raise savings and capital inflows. Whether inflationary pressures and deficits in 
the balance of payments stem from monetary expansion, supply shortages or price 
expectations, therefore, determine the policy measures undertaken. To control inflation and 
the deficit in the balance of payments, fiscal and monetary policies are recommended. Fiscal 
policies are designed to raise the proportion of public revenue to GDP but also to reduce the 
ratio of expenditure to GDP. Monetary policies, on the other hand, involve restraining 
domestic credit to the public sector, both to reduce absorption and release resources to the 
private sector to avoid so-called “crowding out”.  
 
 Supply-side policies of stabilisation programmes stem from the assumption that economies 
need to adjust to eliminate distortion from general equilibrium. For instance, agricultural 
price controls mean that prices do not reflect cost of production and create a disincentive to 
agricultural production. This leads to mis-allocation of resources, shortages of agricultural 
produce, decline in agricultural production, urban migration and environmental degradation. 
Thus, pricing and marketing policies include liberalisation of product marketing, retail and 
producer price increases, adjustment in utility tariffs and liberalisation of prices, particularly 
in the agricultural sector. Other supply side policies include public enterprise policies targeted 
at civil service salaries and employment, improving management, and control of 
administrative expenditure as well as privatisation, and phasing-out and liquidation of state-
owned enterprises. Widening the tax base and improving revenue collection are also part and 
parcel of supply-side policies. Investment programmes are directed to directly productive 
sectors with emphasis on small- to medium-scale agriculture and industries financed mainly 
by domestic private investment and foreign capital. 
  
 The deregulation of capital markets is primarily tackled through measures to reform the 
financial sector and improve the overall process of financial intermediation. The main 
instrument of reform is to increase the nominal rate of interest, normally accompanied by 
measures to raise overall credit available to the private sector, for example through the 
reduction in bank reserve requirements and ceilings on the borrowing capacity of the public 
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sector. The assumption is that repressed interest rates do not reflect the true cost of borrowing 
and lead to low levels of resource mobilisation as savers prefer to hold real rather than 
financial assets, make unproductive investment or send savings abroad (IMF, 1987). The 
argument for interest rate adjustment in the financial sector draws on the conceptual 
foundations laid by the “financial repression models” of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973); 
in essence, the approach suggest that allowing real rates of interest to rise to their market 
clearing level induces higher savings and more effective investment, by raising the latter's 
average efficiency with the crowding out of low-yielding investment projects.  
 
 Trade liberalisation targeted at removal of disincentives to exports is prescribed to restore 
the external balance, as well as on the grounds of efficiency and welfare gains. As regards the 
trade regime, reforms usually include the adoption of a low, uniform tariff structure which 
provides equal effective protection to all producers of tradable goods and the elimination of 
quantitative restrictions; tariffs tend to be described as preferable to quantitative restrictions, 
because the latter insulate domestic producers from world market conditions and stimulate 
rent-seeking and Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking behaviour (DUP) (Krueger, 1974 and 
Bhagwati and Srinivassan, 1980).  
 
 Exchange rate policies have a dual purpose. It is postulated that devaluation leads both to 
expenditure-switching and to expenditure-reduction. The expenditure-switching works 
through altering the price of tradable relative to non-tradable goods. More specifically, 
devaluation is advocated in order to lower the foreign currency price of exports and raises 
domestic currency price of imports, thus encouraging production of export commodities and 
import substitutes. On the other hand, expenditure-reduction is assumed to work through an 
increase in import prices and hence a fall in real wages, in which demand for imports falls 
and reserve holdings improve (the real balance effect). The additional objective of 
devaluation is to unify official exchange rates with parallel rates to curb unofficial 
transactions. 
  
 Reduction of stock of debt to levels where the debt-servicing capacity of a country is 
obtained, the clearing of arrears, also forms part of the policy package. The objective is to 
achieve a sustainable external debt management in programme periods. Sustainability refers 
to use of borrowed resources from external sources or simply savings of non-residents to the 
extent that exports are able to pay the debt without reductions in import requirements. In 
other words, real interest rates paid on debt must not exceed real rates of growth of exports 
(IMF, 1987).  
 
 
3. CRITICS AND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS  
 
 According to Radha (1995), critics of stabilisation programmes as described above can be 
classified into four groups: the “eclectics”, the “structural adjustment with a human face”, the 
“dependency theorists” and the “structuralists”− these ranging from analytical critiques of 
theoretical inconsistency to polemical persuasion. In summary, the main thrust of such 
critiques is that, p. 557: 
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Stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, largely based on the neo-
classical economic rationale, was justifiable neither in terms of the analytical 
nor the historical literature. 
 
The main issues raised by the critics can be summarised as follows. First, the old 
consensus assumes that macroeconomic disequilibrium, particularly economic difficulties in 
SSA, for instance, is caused by internal or domestic policy errors. The implication is that 
external disequilibrium is the result of internal policies that allowed aggregate demand 
(absorption) to exceed aggregate output or income. The orthodoxy treats external causes such 
as decline in the terms of trade or changes in international monetary policy as bearing limited 
responsibility for macroeconomic imbalances. The response to this criticism is that the 
existence of external factors does not mean there is no need for domestic adjustment. External 
economic factors are part of the benign and malign of economics. The emphasis on internal 
factors is because these are under country influence and eligible for financial assistance. 
 
 Second, most of the critical literature focuses on the consequences of reducing aggregate 
demand and the burden of contraction in absorption? As Dell (1982, p. 599) notes: 
 
[A] permanent solution to the problem of cost inflation cannot be obtained by 
seeking to play on the fear of rising unemployment among those who try to 
protect themselves against increases in the cost of living by demanding higher 
wages. 
 
Elsewhere, he adds, p. 608: 
 
Demand deflation, if taken far enough, will ultimately have an impact on cost 
inflation - there is no dispute about that. What is in question is the need for the 
heavy social and economic costs that are involved.  
 
 The objection to austere stabilisation programmes, particularly the reduction in public 
expenditure, has been that it has no human face: the impact is felt on public investment rather 
than private consumption and is disproportionately disadvantageous to those in poverty. 
Public investment in health, education and food subsidies has major implications for poverty 
(Cornia et al, 1987). A fall in domestic credit, particularly to the public sector, also works 
against “crowding-in” the private sector as investment on infrastructure is reduced. Another 
important issue is the effect of stabilisation on income distribution. As Demery and Addison 
(1987) rightly ask, what is the time span for short-term deflation to be offset by long-term 
growth? and do the same groups affected by the costs of short-term adjustment gain in the 
long-term? Dell (1982, p. 598) point out that: 
 
A budget deficit per se tells us nothing about whether aggregate demand is 
excessive or not. It is only when we consider the budget deficit in conjunction 
with other demands on private saving - namely gross investment and net 
exports - that we can tell whether aggregate demand is excessive ... One must 
distinguish between that part of a budget deficit which is an automatic 
response to the low level of business activity, leading to reduced government 
revenues and higher government transfers, and the rest of the deficit which 
could add to demand even at a higher level of employment. 
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 In response, the IFIs, particularly the IMF, have argued that public expenditure reviews 
focus on the quality and composition of the budget rather than simply the quantity of the 
budget deficit (Tanzi, 1989 and 1994). Although, reducing unproductive expenditures is 
highly influenced by political considerations, current emphasis is on expenditures that do not 
result in improved provision of basic human needs, such as military expenditure, subsidies 
that favour certain social classes, and expansion of public employment at the expense of real 
wage reductions (Green, 1991). 
 
 Third, regarding long-term growth, Stewart (1992) notes that primary commodity 
production and objectives such as technological learning, human capital development, 
industrial development and regional trade (which require increased public expenditure and 
co-ordination) are incompatible (export pessimism). Wangwe (1994) also argues long-term 
diversification objectives can only be achieved by designing technology policy, improving 
organisational, marketing skills and human development, which the market cannot guarantee. 
 
 Fourth, there exists a critical literature which argues that: 1) the assumption of the law of 
one price is suspect; 2) inflation-cum-balance of payments problems are inherently related to 
the structure of production and distribution in an economy; and 3) the response of primary 
exports needs more than relative price changes. Policies such as investment programmes and 
targeted subsidies must be considered. Therefore, policy prescriptions must fully capture 
bottlenecks and rigidities in the process of production and consumption. Demand restraint in 
the short term can lead to a fall in output, investment and capacity to generate foreign 
exchange in the long-term. Taylor (1987, p. 20), for instance, notes: 
 
What usually happens under a demand-reduction programme is that the price 
mechanism is short circuited. The cut-back in real purchases make production 
fall, cutting import needs directly ... Indeed by holding down domestic 
investment, austerity may make repatriation of foreign incomes unattractive, as 
seems to be the case in Sudan. 
 
 Critics also highlight the negative effects of policies such as devaluation and restraint in 
the expansion of domestic credit. Devaluation leads to stagflation as demand for imports tend 
to be inelastic for most industries and agriculture. Dependence on imported capital and 
intermediate goods as well as fertiliser inputs is not recognised. As noted by Katseli (1983), 
initial increases in production costs in non-tradable sectors might reverse desired outcomes, 
which are increases in prices of tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods. Alternatively, 
prices of non-tradable goods might also increase by same proportion as devaluation if wages 
are fixed or indexed to consumer prices. If a sector is import-dependent, in the short-term, the 
effect of devaluation might also be reductions in exports. Moreover, Loxley (1990) observes, 
for instance, supply response to devaluation depends on the characteristics of commodities 
(crops or minerals). The timing of devaluation is also critical since tree-crops and minerals 
depend on harvest and gestation periods. The implication is that structural characteristics 
determine adjustment outcomes. Helleiner (1983a) also questions the political sustainability 
of reductions in urban real wage in countries where they are already at a minimum. Thus, he 
states, p. 352: 
 
Getting prices right is slow-acting medicine in poorest countries where 
markets function more imperfectly because of rigidities, inflexibilities, and 
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market segmentation. The short- to medium-term burden of adjustment 
inevitably falls disproportionately upon income and the volume of imports. 
 
 The assumption behind expenditure-switching and expenditure-reduction policies is that 
exports and imports are responsive to prices so that capital and intermediate goods could be 
substituted without causing disruptions in investment and output. According to the elasticities 
approach, for a devaluation to improve the current account, the Marshall-Lerner condition 
must be satisfied; the sum of the elasticities of demand for imports and exports needs to be 
greater than one. However, critics argue that constraints on export expansion in low-income 
countries, for example, are not only prices but also income and other structural bottlenecks. 
For instance, it has been shown that external demand determines primary commodity exports 
rather than relative prices. With the adoption of common stabilisation programmes - hence 
devaluation by a majority of identical commodity producer countries - there is danger of a 
fallacy of composition effect (Weeks, 1995). Lack of vital inputs such as fertilisers, transport 
infrastructure and foreign exchange also make supply of exports price-inelastic.  
 
 The idea that devaluation releases exportable goods from local consumption and prevents 
imports from competing with locally produced goods has been questioned because of limited 
substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, particularly in developing economies. 
Moreover, increases in import prices and consequent fall in absorption could have a negative 
effect on investment, output and prices as domestic capital and intermediate sectors are 
underdeveloped and dependent on imports such as machinery and spare parts. Some 
influential theoretical studies have also shown that devaluation has serious distributional 
implications as propensities to save differ between low-income urban wage earners and high-
income profit earners (Krugman and Taylor, 1978). It is also argued a devaluation increases 
foreign currency denominated external debt undermining public sector fiscal finances.  
  
 Critics also point out that the use of the exchange rate as an expenditure reducing policy 
conflicts with domestic credit restraint. In a monetarist model, devaluation increases domestic 
price levels vis-à-vis a rise in local currency price of imports. Assuming a constant supply of 
money and where the demand for money is a function of income and price, increases in 
domestic price levels raise the demand for money. This means, without reduction in domestic 
credit, money market equilibrium could be achieved. Therefore, stabilisation packages, which 
include a simultaneous domestic credit restraint and devaluation, will result in double 
deflation.  
 
 To what extent do these criticisms lead to alternative policy packages? As noted by 
Williamson (1983a, p. 355), they need to stand the test of empiricism. 
 
Of course, any imaginative economic theorist can invent paradoxical cases in 
which the balance of payments would benefit by revaluation (low elasticities 
of demand and high elasticities of supply), credit expansion (output of 
exportables constrained by credit-financed imported inputs), increased 
government spending (on debottle necking the tradable goods sector), or 
whatever; but one needs some pretty strong empirical evidence that such 
circumstances actually exist before one can prudently embrace the paradoxical 




4. INTERROGATING THE LONG RUN OR TO WHAT ARE THE IMF AND WORLD 
BANK ADJUSTING?  
  
 To a large extent, much of the previous discussion reflects disputes over the efficiency and 
goals of short-run macroeconomic management and corresponding analytical perspectives 
and with some presumption that all will turn out well in the long run if the short run is 
managed appropriately. Such thinking has, however, been increasingly eroded not least, no 
doubt, due to the lengthening period over which successive stabilisation programmes have 
been experienced collectively and by individual countries. Further, the emergence of both 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) brought the conventional distinction between the IMF and the World Bank into 
question. Structural adjustment after the Berg Report in 1981 was a terrain left to the World 
Bank while short-term stabilisation was that of the IMF.9 The conventional distinction 
between the former’s role as a development and project lender and the latter as financier of 
balance of payments is no longer applicable. As Bird (1995, p.70) questions, and as far as 
development is concerned, “where does one end and the other begin?” In recent years, the 
functions of these institutions began to overlap. While the IMF began to reiterate structural 
concerns the World Bank began to emphasise the importance of macroeconomic stabilisation 
for the success of its programmes (Mosley et al, 1995). And, according to Killick (1995, 
p.76): 
 
It could also be seen as a Fund response to the movement by the World Bank 
into the area of macroeconomic policy, with the growth during the 1980s of its 
structural adjustment lending; and the increased growth of the debt problems 
in the early 1980s, with an associated emergence for the first time of a problem 
of countries falling into arrears in servicing their past IMF credits. 
 
 In short, the issue of stabilisation demands a response to the question “around what?” 
Other than as an answer in terms of (balance of payments) equilibrium, it is remarkable how 
little attention the IMF has devoted to this issue. It is as if looking at the short run inevitably 
takes care of the long run - a sort of pennies and pounds philosophy applied to the balance of 
payments and extrapolated to the economy as a whole. This neglect is all the more telling 
since criticism of stabilisation has often focused upon the damaging effects of deflationary 
policies on current output and investment, the latter representing a key link to future growth, 
quite apart from the erosion of socio-economic infrastructure and stability.  
 
 However, the issue of the long run has not been entirely overlooked by the IMF. In their 
attempt in the IMF Staff Papers to address the link between macroeconomic stabilisation and 
longer-term economic growth, Khan and Montiel (1989) sought to construct “a conceptual 
                                                          
9 The gesture, however, was not taken seriously among the critics as it meant strict conditionalities and long-term 
involvement of the IMF in a nation’s policy decision-making process. Moreover, the shift from short-term 
stabilisation to structural adjustment was merely a longer-term financial commitment rather than a major 
paradigm shift in ideological or theoretical terms. The IMF even in its structural adjustment programmes relied 
on the traditional policy instruments. Exchange rate adjustment (devaluation), credit restraint and raising interest 
rates are the main policies still pursued. Moreover, the effect of adjustment on poverty alleviation has also 
become an important issue (Tanzi, 1994). However, within the IMF itself, there is doubt about the efficacy of 
macroeconomic adjustment in addressing poverty issues (Polak, 1991).  
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framework” for “growth-oriented adjustment programs”.10 This is undoubtedly a worthy goal. 
For a major criticism of stabilisation policies, however valid they might be in theory and 
practice, is their failure to assess their longer-term impact on growth, particularly in view of 
their frequent short-run deflationary impact.11 Khan and Montiel explicitly seek to bring 
together the growth model of the World Bank - the Revised Minimum Standard Model 
(RMSM) - and the Polak model or Financial Programming (FP) model associated with the 
IMF. In a comment, Polak (1990) refers to a “marriage” between the two models, a term that 
is accepted by Khan and Montiel (1990) in their response.  
 
 The nature of the union, however, can be looked at from a number of perspectives. For 
Khan and Montiel, there is a clear analytical attraction and synthesis. RMSM is a two-gap 
model in which the level of foreign exchange that can be financed determines the potential 
level of output (growth). It does, however, take the price level as exogenous. On the other 
hand, FP is a model which determines the changes in the balance of payments and the level of 
nominal income, with the latter's division between real output and price left open for policy 
speculation. Consequently, each model can be closed in the mathematical sense by the 
contribution made by the other. RMSM determines output for FP, and FP determines prices 
for RMSM. As it were, irrespective of the conceptual basis of the two models, and since they 
have variables in common, they are mathematical complements. 
 
 A second feature of the merged model is to combine the short run of the FP with the long 
run of the RMSM. As already hinted, a third, closely related but separate feature is to link 
short-run macroeconomic equilibrium with long-run growth. It is, however, the burden of this 
section to establish that the outcome of the exercise is entirely unsuccessful despite 
exaggerated claims to the contrary. The short-run features of the framework are entirely 
dominant. Indeed, as will be shown below, no growth model emerges at all, with the RMSM 
functioning purely in the first respect listed above, as a means of closing the short-run FP 
model.12 
 
 To some extent, this consequence of the marriage is cloaked by the formal terms in which 
Khan and Montiel construct their analysis, which is technically inelegant. They employ 
discrete rather than continuous time. Further, they only examine the changes after one period 
of time, p. 281, “[T]he model assumes continuous equilibrium; because the model is specified 
in discrete time, all adjustments take place in one period”. Of course, equilibrium at all times 
does not necessarily mean that all adjustment takes place in one period. As long as there is a 
distinction between short- and long-run equilibrium, the model would generate a path of the 
one around the other. By collapsing all adjustment into a single period, Khan and Montiel are 
essentially extinguishing the distinction between the short and the long run. Moreover, it 
cannot be presumed that what happens in the first period is representative of the impact upon 
the long-run growth path. For example, in the standard neoclassical one-sector growth model, 
                                                          
10 The quotes are taken from the subtitle and title of their article, respectively. See also Khan and Montiel 
(1990). 
11 For a critical exposition of the Khan and Montiel approach, see Tarp (1992) and Tarp and Brixen (1996), for 
example. 
12 As in much economics, the precise distinctions and connections between the long and short runs are left vague 
as well as the justification for them. 
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consider a reduction in the rate of saving and a corresponding increase in the level of short-
run consumption. Whether this is reproduced in the long run depends upon whether the initial 
saving rate was above or below the golden rule level (equal to the growth rate). For, if the 
saving rate is unreasonably high, the level of consumption can be increased in both the short 
and the long run by decreasing saving. Otherwise, at a saving rate below the golden rule 
level, there is a genuine trade-off between present and future consumption. In any case, it is 
readily apparent in the Khan and Montiel model that it is the long run that suffers the fate of 
being dead in the short run, so skewed is the analysis towards the short run, see Appendix 2. 
 
 The results of the analysis can be briefly summarised. First, despite claims to the contrary, 
the merged model proposed by Khan and Montiel does not combine the short and long runs to 
provide a theory of growth and adjustment. Second, this is because long run, stable growth is 
precluded in their own version of the marriage. Third, the resulting pre-occupation with the 
short run is unduly pessimistic with the scope for adjustment (through policy-inspired 
parameter shifts in factor productivity and balance of trade, for example) being unscaled 
relative to output and, hence, increasingly limited automatically as growth occurs. Fourth, if 
the model is amended to allow for the possibility of steady-state balanced growth, it generally 
leads to unstable outcomes unless holdings of foreign reserves start or adjust by chance to the 
right proportions, or unless the monetary authority has the capacity both to identify the long-
run growth path and to adjust to it directly. Finally, this implies that the table of results 
produced by Khan and Montiel, connecting shifts in exogenous and policy variables to 
adjustment in one period are either totally meaningless or totally unnecessary. In case of 
imperfect monetary policy and instability, first period shifts do not necessarily indicate 
subsequent direction of movement, nor changes in the underlying growth path, if any. For a 
perfect monetary authority, adjustment is irrelevant; it goes straight to the appropriate growth 
path. 
 
 Thus, the model presented by Khan and Montiel does not satisfactorily address the long 
run. It is worth recalling the economic assumptions on which it is based which tend to be 
obscured by the complexity of the algebra and their being mingled with accounting identities. 
There are saving, demand for money, production and balance of trade functions, all of which 
are extremely simple. It hardly seems that an apposite model of the long run could emerge 
from such a simple framework, let alone address the short run and the articulation between 
the two. It is absolutely incapable of addressing the fundamental policy issues of how to 
generate productivity increases and sustain international competitiveness. How the 
corresponding causal factors are situated relative to the short and long run is also necessarily 
absent. Further, as in all steady-state, long-run growth models, shift in the composition of 
output to reflect modernisation, industrialisation, or whatever, is inevitably absent even 
though this is the one concession that Agenor and Montiel (1996) make in constructing a 
specifically development macroeconomics, on which see below. Presumably, such sectoral 
and socio-economic transitions can be left to microeconomics and market forces. 
 
 In many ways, the limitations of the marriage model revealed here are formalisations of 
Polak's (1990) misgivings, reiterated in Polak (1997). For him, the model of FP is only 
appropriate for examining the short run in stylised circumstances, to correct balance of 
payments rather than to target other objectives such as growth, and to leave the level of output 
to be assessed through iterative judgment rather than from formal modelling, especially from 
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the RMSM that has been constructed for entirely different purposes. Indeed, in a personal 
communication commenting on the model developed here, Polak suggests:13 
 
My view is that (the marriage) is not a worthwhile project, and each subject 
should be approached on its own, provided the practitioners are fully aware of 
any recommended policies on the other objective (which to be sure has not 
always been the case between the Fund and the Bank). A possible simile, 
somewhat limping of course: the jobs of a schoolteacher and a paediatrician 
are both to do good to a child, and each should be aware of the other … but the 
professions should remain specialised for greatest efficiency in each field. But 
what is true within his analogy surely does not hold for the stabilisation and 
growth of an economy where the short and long runs are intimately and 
directly connected to one another.  
 
 Khan and Montiel (1990) interpret Polak’s critique as demanding a more complex 
marriage between the two models. Add more variables, disaggregate more, or introduce more 
behavioural relations. For example, they suggest that output could be made responsive to 
prices in the short run rather than dependent upon the build-up of capacity through saving and 
investment. In similar and cavalier fashion, Khan et al (1990) assert that their analysis can be 
made more realistic by introducing more endogeneity into their model, through a variable 
ICOR and investment function, p. 166, and through a more complex monetary sector and lags 
in price and wage adjustments, p. 176 and p. 167. They pride themselves on having made the 
model available in view of, “the combination of widespread interest in Bank-Fund programs 
and the scarce existing literature on the methodology employed”. They confess, “that the 
simple model plays an important role when it comes to the quantitative macroeconomic 
analysis”, p. 177. They explain the survival of such simple models on the basis of their 
limited informational requirements that can be, “supplemented by both qualitative and 
quantitative judgments ... to work well in predicting outcomes for the principal 
macroeconomic variables”, p. 178. These are nothing short of outrageous claims for a model 
whose internal properties are such as to generate zero or unstable growth! 
 
 Khan and Montiel (1990, p. 191) close their debate with Polak as follows: 
 
The model ... can serve as a basis for the development of more realistic models 
that capture the complexities of growth and adjustment, if only by focusing the 
discussion on precise identification of the model's shortcomings, thereby 
permitting superior, but equally policy-relevant, alternatives to emerge. 
 
 As will be seen in the next section, the extension of the IMF model to include that of the 
World Bank, or in a variety of other ways, has the effect of distancing itself from its origins 
within financial programming. The latter ultimately becomes a fetter on model development. 
By the same token, by introducing more theory and more variables, it becomes possible and 
necessary to widen the scope of what is to be addressed – as in the case just considered of 
attaching financial programming to long-run growth. As will be shown, this opens the way for 
                                                          
13 In his comment on the marriage of the IMF and World Bank models, Polak (1990) argues the attempt, firstly, 
“incapacitates each from doing its own job”, secondly, “the simplicity that accounted for part of attraction of the 
two models is lost in their merger”, p. 184, and, finally, apart from intellectual curiosity, “it adds little to our 
knowledge on the crucial issues of growth-oriented adjustment”, p. 186. 
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5. TOWARDS THE POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
 
 Over the years the IMF’s analytical position has shifted from being rooted in the simplest 
versions of the monetary approach to the balance of payments to being dependent upon a 
range of economic theory and factors. How this is to be interpreted, however, depends upon 
whether a perspective is taken that is forward- or backward-looking from the original model 
of financial programming based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments. Polak 
(1997), in reviewing the place of his model after forty years, is forward-looking in the sense 
of asking how it has adapted and survived in the light of the demands placed upon it.14 He 
remains sceptical about the worth of general, universally applicable models and merely seeks 
to provide a framework within which guesswork can be employed. He reiterates the results 
and relevance of the earlier model, emphasising dependence upon a constant income velocity 
of money, but also stresses the limitations of the approach, rendering it inappropriate for 
economies in transition for example. He is concerned with the short-run, with correcting the 
balance of payments through a squeeze on domestic credit creation, and is sceptical about the 
extent to which the model can be extended over time or to other policy objectives other than 
through reiteration of guesswork concerning macroeconomic estimates. Stick to financial 
programming within its limitations is his core message. 
 
 Consider, for example, one of his “counterintuitive” findings that “constitute a useful bag 
of knowledge for international officials in their relations with national policy makers”. For 
Polak, an increase in output, including exports, from whatever source will only provide 
temporary relief to the balance of payments since the rise in income will ultimately leak out 
into higher imports. However, for this result to hold, and others that he gives, it is necessary 
for the economy to function in the most restricted fashion – no extra investment and capacity 
from the increased output and, presumably saving and investment, let alone the release of any 
dynamic economies of scale and scope. There is a perverse logic to the Polak position in 
which, because the economy is perceived to be highly rigid and inflexible so macroeconomic 
policy is adopted to reflect and possibly make it so!  
 
 By contrast, consider the Development Macroeconomics text of Agenor and Montiel 
(1996) running to nearly 700 pages.15 Although “the product of many years of research 
…mostly in the stimulating environment of the Research Department of the International 
Monetary Fund”, p. vi, only a handful of pages are devoted to financial programming. They 
can be considered to be backward looking, rejecting the use of the models attached to 
financial programming in view of their excessive simplicity. Indeed, they offer the judgment 
that, among the most parsimonious models aimed at quantifying the effects of stabilisation 
programs and medium-term growth policies are those of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank, p. 423. Instead, they offer a macroeconomics that falls entirely within the 
new microfoundations of macroeconomics for which financial programming and the 
                                                          
14 As Polak’s paper was downloaded from the Internet, page references are not given. 
 
15 Is it significant that this is published outside the umbrella of the IMF? 
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monetary approach to the balance of payments are an irrelevance as starting point. For them, 
p. 11/12: 
 
We do not believe that economic agents in developing countries behave 
differently from those in industrial economies in ways that are inconsistent 
with the rational optimising principle of neoclassical microeconomics; rather, 
we believe that they behave similarly to their industrial counterparts, but 
operate in a different environment. Our perspective is that the standard 
analytical tools of modern macroeconomics are indeed of as much relevance to 
developing countries as they are to industrial countries, but that different 
models are needed to analyse familiar issues. 
 
 In place of different analytical principles, Agenor and Montiel offer what they term 
structural differences in order to provide a specifically development macroeconomics. In this 
respect, they are themselves most parsimonious. For, by structural, they merely mean 
imperfectly working markets such as the informal sector, labour market segmentation, or 
financial repression, or differences in the composition or source of output, as in heavy 
reliance upon public sector production, working capital or imported intermediate goods. For 
them, explicitly seeking to provide a counterbalance to what is presumed to be the extreme 
stances adopted by leading structuralists such as Lance Taylor, p. 3:16 
 
Many of the areas in which “orthodox” thinking has provided much insight 
(has) … ironically, even strengthened new structuralist arguments.  
 
 It is important to recognise that such structuralist arguments are being appropriated and 
reinterpreted within a mainstream neoclassical microeconomic framework.17 This is precisely 
the form taken both by the Washington consensus and by the more general developments 
within economics, which allow it both to address economic and non-economic structures. It 
follows that the differences between the IMF and the World Bank in macroeconomic 
analytics can only be exaggerated, although the depth of acceptance of the new principles 
within the IMF and their scope of application in practice is another question. Indeed, if only 
in retrospect, the evolution of the eclectic models underlying financial programming can be 
seen as a convergence towards the new consensus, the gap only being closed once the 
obsession with financial targets and modelling is abandoned. Such a convergence, or is it a 
parallel path, is almost inevitable given the broadening of policy goals, the increasing 
                                                          
16 They refer explicitly to Taylor (1979, 1983 and 1991). 
 
17 See also Ascher (1996, p. 333): 
 
The connections among economic theory, analytic approaches, and economic policy 
prescriptions have often been very loose. This has permitted the translations of neoclassical 
theory into applications and policy doctrines that have strayed rather far from original 
neoclassical tenets. This looseness has permitted the neoclassical methodological framework 
to swallow up alternative, so-called structuralist theoretical models. However, this neoclassical 
imperialism or consensus has limited the explicit consideration of development strategies, if 
not excluding the de facto selection of sectoral and distributional strategies. At the same time, 
the looseness has left neoclassical approaches vulnerable to suspect associations with 
regressive distributional doctrines, through equally loose or uneven unfair associations with 
austerity programs and “trickle-down economics”. 
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complexity of models attached to financial programming, and the commitment to mainstream 
neoclassical economics. For the latter has itself, within a more general context, evolved 
towards the micro-foundations of macroeconomics that inform the new consensus. 
 
 As the same time backtracking to the microeconomics of macroeconomic foundations, the 
new consensus also qualifies the state vs. market discourse. The essence of the argument, 
contained in the 1998 WIDER annual lecture by Joseph Stiglitz, is not that the state 
intervention is large or small, but whether it can deliver the right policies. The new consensus 
allows a significant role for the state to continue its intervention in a slightly different way: in 
institutional arrangements (as a regulator of financial transactions, promoter of human capital, 
and financier for infrastructure development). According to Stiglitz, markets are not 
necessarily efficient in the allocation of scarce resources. This contrasts with the ideology of 
the Washington consensus that government failure is worse that market failure. Stiglitz notes, 
“the East Asian economies, for instance, emphasised the role of government in providing 
universal education, which was a necessary part of their transformation from agrarian to 
rapidly industrialising economies … “left to itself, the market will tend to under-provide 
human capital”, p. 25.  
 
The particulars of the new consensus is that sate must be involved in maintaining 
institutions, establish antitrust laws and agencies, regulate capital markets, and set up social 
safety nets. For instance, Stiglitz concludes that “the dogma of liberalisation has become an 
end in itself and not a means to a better financial system.” Financial markets left alone cannot 
perform well in selecting the most productive recipients of investment funds or of monitoring 
the allocation of funds. Therefore, the public sector has a regulatory role: “the key issue 
should not be liberalisation or deregulation but construction of the regulatory framework that 
insures an effective financial system”, p. 18. 
 
 The orthodoxy is blamed for neglecting institutional arrangements and for creating a 
gap that is filled in by informal arrangements: organised crime or fraudulent financial 
intermediaries. Lack of proper institutional arrangements are also said to have led to a 
widening inequality and growing poverty. Stiglitz acknowledged that “greater humility” is 
needed and called for an end to misguided policies imposed by the Washington consensus. 
Stiglitz's condemnation of the Washington consensus and the conditionalities imposed on 
adjusting countries raise fundamental questions about the entire macroeconomic stabilisation 
programmes advanced by the IMF and World Bank. Stiglitz stated that the set of policies 
which underlay the Washington consensus are “sometimes misguided” … Making markets 
work requires more than just low inflation; it requires sound financial regulation, competition 
policy, and policies to facilitate the transfer of technology and to encourage transparency, to 
cite some fundamental issues neglected by the Washington consensus”, p. 7. Stiglitz continue 
to argue that the Washington consensus aimed to bring about increases in measured GDP, 
whereas the appropriate objective would have been to aim for increases in living standards - 
including improved infrastructure and equitable development.  
 
 Stiglitz asserts that although hyperinflation might be costly, an inflation rate below 40 
per cent per annum is acceptable. Furthermore, there is no evidence that one increase in 
inflation causes further increases (slippery slope). Thus unduly targeting inflation “may not 
only distort economic policies – preventing the economy from living up to its full growth and 
output potentials – but also lead to institutional arrangements that reduce economic flexibility 
without gaining growth benefits”, p. 12. Moreover, budget deficits may not be detrimental if 
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investment is allocated in high return areas as in primary education and physical infrastructure 
such as road networks and energy.18 Thus “it may make sense for the government to treat 
foreign aid as a legitimate source of revenue, just like taxes, and balance the budget inclusive 
of foreign aid” as the case of Ethiopia demonstrates, p. 12. 
 
Stiglitz argue that macro-economic stability may not be the right target variable to focus 
on, p. 14. 
 
Macroeconomic stability, as conceived by the Washington consensus, typically 
downplays stabilising output or unemployment. Minimising or avoiding major 
economic contractions should be one of the most important goals of policy. In 
the short run, large-scale involuntary unemployment is clearly inefficient - in 
purely economic terms it represents idle resources that could be used more 
productively. 
 
Concerning privatisation competition and not ownership is crucial. Monopolies can lead to 
excess profits and inefficiency. Government must intervene and foster the creation of a 
competitive environment. The implication being that the expectations of the old consensus on 
the benefits of privatisation were ambitious and the costs were not fully considered. 
According to Stiglitz, the benefits accrue prior to privatisation, through a process of 
corporatization, which involves creating proper incentives.  
 
According to the development agenda the Washington consensus mixed up ends with 
means. While constructing a post-Washington consensus, policy makers have to realise that 
interest rate, exchange rate, and fiscal prudence should not be the sole aim of economic 
policy. These are the means that should ensure the ultimate objective: sustainable 
development and the well being of the people. These are calls for a new consensus which 
should not be drafted in Washington and which calls for a frank acknowledgment that the 
“Washington consensus does not offer answers to every important question in development”, 
p. 10.  
  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Despite considerable ingenuity and change in analytical content, the stabilisation 
framework has remained riddled with inadequacies that are transparent to those who are 
prepared to look. For those inadequacies can be and have been revealed even on the theory’s 
own terms or within its own methodologies. Consequently, the critical account offered here is 
based in large part upon reference to the work of those, relatively few in number, who have 
been prepared to engage in more circumspect assessment of the standard material. 
Necessarily, an account of this sort does depend upon the use of standard terminology and 
concepts. These may be particularly mystifying to those studying macroeconomic stabilisation 
                                                          
18 On choice of education policy, Stiglitz adds, the right strategy may not always be primary education. Tertiary 
and particularly university technical education has a high economic return principally because it enables the 
economy to import ideas. Stiglitz emphasises that the training of more scientists and engineers and not extra 
liberal arts graduates as were trained in much of Africa is in need. And he points out that university education 
leads to an automatic increase in disparity of income among social classes. This is because “the direct 
beneficiaries ... are almost always better off than average.” See Fine and Rose (1999). 
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from the vantage point of other disciplines. However, the central message of that is being 
delivered here is that the technical and statistical wizardry of macroeconomics, intimidating 
in itself, is based upon the most nebulous of analytical foundations if, indeed, there are any 
foundations at all that are able to stand up even to the most cursory critical scrutiny. Those 
willing to challenge the theory from a more radical methodology than its own, even one 
which would be far from radical within other social sciences, can point to the following 
fundamental features: its obsession with monetary variables; its dependence on market 
perfection as an organising concept, the artificial division between the short and long run; and 
the equally sharp and artificial division between exogenous and endogenous factors. 
 
 The issues are that a macroeconomics of stabilisation, certainly as conceived by orthodox 
economics and adopted by the Washington consensus, is a false objective, since economies 
are too heterogeneous to be lumped together for the purpose of a common treatment. The 
review of macroeconomics offered here suggests that this conclusion might be accepted 
readily, for recent theoretical developments provide support for the view that developing 
economies function in a variety of different ways from one another - though particular ideal 
types are often taken as representative of the economy as a whole. But, even if to insist upon 
the heterogeneity of economies is to push against an open door, it remains important to have a 
clear idea of the chamber we are leaving behind in entering and occupying new analytical 
space. The intellectual dynamic by which macroeconomics is now accommodating theory is 
far from satisfactory, even if it is more varied in what will be seen to be a microeconomic 
eclecticism. 
 
 First, observe that the new microeconomics has opened up a very wide range of 
applications - not only the new Keynesian economics but also new trade theory, new finance 
theory, as well as addressing the role of non-economic factors in economic performance. The 
problem is, however, that these separate avenues are rarely fully integrated with one another, 
except in the simplest of fashions. This is hardly surprising since the mathematics of the 
models concerned soon becomes intractable. And, even where it is not, the dynamics of what 
results is horrendously complex as it involves both multiple equilibria and paths to or around 
them. Significantly, such is the case for the new growth theory which, in principle at least, 
ought to handle the problems raised in this paper as it attempts to deal with endogenously 
generated different growth paths in which initial conditions, or the short run, cannot influence 
longer-term outcomes. 
 
 These models, however, very rarely deal with unemployment in the short run and usually 
only disaggregate the economy for the purpose of mapping the dynamics of technical change 
(with, for example, a sector of the economy set aside for producing and/or using human 
capital and/or R&D). They are also fundamentally organised around steady-state balanced 
growth, albeit with potential for endogenous, multiple, equilibria with complex dynamics 
relative to more traditional exogenous growth Harrod-Domar models. In short, such models 
are totally inappropriate for examining development in the sense of economies undergoing 
fundamental structural shifts, which, in part, involve changes in the composition of output 
with industrialisation. 
 
 In this respect, structuralist models are also inadequate, and subject to neoclassical 
incorporation, to the extent that they take as given and model what are perceived to be fixed 
features of a developing economy. On the positive side, they do place a focus upon some 
Keynesian and structural aspects that are liable to be damagingly overlooked by more 
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orthodox approaches. Yet, their treatment of the relationship between short and long runs is 
equally problematic, not least because the economy tends to be perceived as a distortion from 
that constructed by the orthodoxy. Indeed, the latter often results as a special case of the 
structuralist account for an extreme choice of parameter values - in degree of monopoly, wage 
level of whatever. 
 
 It is all very well criticising the inadequacies of available models but what are the 
alternatives? Here, we would make a number of points. First, development and growth are the 
consequence of the pursuit of underlying economic and political interests. Second, these are 
structured in particular ways both through the state and through the market. Third, they are 
subject to tendencies such as monopolisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, and 
proletarianisation. Fourth, these give rise to conflicts whose resolutions cannot be 
predetermined. Fifth, taken together, these features impart particular features and dynamics to 
individual countries for which general modelling is inappropriate even if supplemented by 
country-specific parameters and judgement. Last, this is both to appeal for country-specific 
studies and to recognise the limitations of any modelling, however progressive. At most, it 
captures limited features of what is involved whilst necessarily setting aside those features 
that it does not cover and presuming they remain “exogenous”, the modern parlance in the 
economist's tool-kit for ceteris paribus. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE POLAK MODEL FOR FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING 
 
 The standard interpretation of the Polak model is to suggest that it determines money 
income but leaves its component parts, prices and real output, undetermined. Imports, Z, are 
lagged one period so that Zt = z + mYt-1, where Y is national income and z and m are 
parameters. Also Mt = kYt, circular flow of income generated by level of money injection, 
where M is overall supply of money to the domestic economy; and Mt - Mt-1 = Xt - Zt + Ft + 
DCt, where F and DC are increases in foreign inflows and domestic credit, respectively, and 
X is exports. Hence, kYt - kYt-1 = (X - z + F + DC) - mYt-1, where terms in brackets are 
assumed to be exogenous (and their time subscripts have been dropped). For equilibrium, Yt 
= Yt-1, and Y = (X - z + F + DC)/m = A/m. Note, X, z, F and DC all have the same effect but 
for sign.  
 
 Equilibrium income is determined by an import multiplier and, if Y is given at full 
employment or trend, then this serves to determine long run equilibrium price. For 
adjustment, with yt = Yt - Y, i.e. deviations from equilibrium, then kyt = (k - m)yt-1. Thus, yt 
converges to zero (if k>m). If in the short run, yt>0, say because of an increase in domestic 
credit, then imports will be too high and foreign reserves will flow out, with some of the extra 
demand taken up in prices and some in output if there is some excess capacity. Ultimately, the 
long run equilibrium will have been reached with the extra imports in the meantime having 
been paid for through a loss in reserves. This will also have reduced the real domestic money 
supply to its appropriate level. 
 
 One way of looking at the (Chicago) pure monetary approach is to see all of this occurring 
instantaneously, rather than over time. The economy is always at full employment. Increase in 
domestic credit, with a fixed exchange rate, cannot go into higher prices since these would 
then be higher than world prices and money would flow abroad to purchase. Consequently, 
the increase in the domestic money supply is matched by an immediate equal and opposite 
outflow of reserves. In other words, the domestic money supply is effectively fixed by world 
prices, the exchange rate, the level of output and the velocity of circulation. Any excess flows 
abroad. This also makes clear that the Polak version implicitly rejects the law of one price (if 
nominal income rises through prices in the short run) or fixed output (if it rises through 
output), and differs from the monetary approach in these respects.  
 
 
APPENDIX 2: MODELING THE MARRIAGE 
 
 The purpose here is to expose formally the critical limitations of the Khan and Montiel 
model of merging the short-run and long run models, respectively, of the IMF and the World 
Bank. This is to justify the results discussed informally in the main text. Their first equation 
is: 
 
 dy = α0 + α1dk   (1) 
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where y is real output, k is capital stock, α0 is an autonomous increase in productivity, and α1 
is the output-capital ratio.19 It follows immediately that steady-state balanced growth is 
impossible unless α0 is equal to zero. For, otherwise: 
 
 dy/y = α0/y + α1dk/y 
 
 Consequently, for constant dk/y (the real saving/investment rate, assumed constant at s, 
say), the growth rate falls asymptotically towards α1s, the Harrod-Domar warranted growth 
rate as y increases. 
 
 This raises the issue of how to make a sensible treatment of the long-run growth path 
within this framework. An alternative to α0 = 0 is to make the productivity increase 
proportional to the economic variables, y say, rather than a lump absolute sum, irrespective of 
the existing size of the economy. Then, the equilibrium growth rate simply becomes equal to 
w = α0 + α1s which is a more traditional way of imposing exogenous technical progress. It is, 
of course, tempting to suggest that the alternative formulation offered by Khan and Montiel, 
in which steady-state growth (i.e. long-run equilibrium) is impossible and (the absurd 
assumption that) the absolute contribution of technical progress is independent of the 
economy's scale, is a reflection both of the pessimistic and short-run outlook of the posited 
framework. This is a theme that will recur throughout what follows.20 
 
 Consider, for example, the role of taxation, t, and government expenditure, g. With s now 
standing for the saving rate out of disposable income, and the government budget surplus (or 
government saving) being translated into net investment. Then, for Khan and Montiel: 
 
 dk = s(y-t) + (t-g) 
 
 Again, without going into the simple details, steady-state balance growth is not possible 
unless t and g are made proportional to income. And, the short-run view makes a higher level 
of government expenditure and a lower level of taxation seem unduly disadvantageous to 
growth since, in the long run, short-run increases above trend will subsequently fade into 
insignificance. If we assume that government expenditure has no impact on growth, surely 
unreasonable in the long run, then if t and g now stand for their proportion of long-run 
income: 
 
                                                          
19. Labour is implicitly assumed to be unlimited. 
20. Selowsky and van der Tak (1986) employ the RMSM model to determine the shifts in the savings rate, the 
capital-output ratio, the export surplus and the availability of foreign finance, which will warrant a particular pattern 
of growth whilst eliminating debt. Necessarily, this avoids the issues of price determination and of determining 
whether steady state is stable. But, at least exports are allowed to grow in principle. Nonetheless, not surprisingly, 
conclusions are both pessimistic and, essentially, tautologous, p. 1115: 
 
 Regaining creditworthiness will be difficult to the extent that consumption growth cannot be 
restrained, the ICOR is high, exports cannot be rapidly expanded or imports compressed, and the 
average rate of interest on foreign debt is high. 
 
In the context of Honduras, Caceras (1993) critically assesses this approach from the perspective of these variables 
not necessarily being under the control of domestic management. 
 25 
 w = dy/y = α0 + α1s + α1t(1-s) - α1g 
 
 Thus, t and g are equivalent to a positive and negative shift, respectively, in the warranted 
rate of growth on the assumption, it is worth repeating, that the public saving is translated into 
real investment and government expenditure makes no contribution to the growth rate.21 
 
 Now let the balance of trade deficit in foreign currency be B.22 This is equivalent to an in-
flow of real resources so that the growth equation becomes modified as follows: 
 
 dy = wy + (α1e/p)B     (2) 
 
where p is the domestic price level, assumed to be equal to e for purchasing power parity, and 
e is the exchange rate. Here, the trade balance is being allowed to vary with the real exchange 
rate, e/p, which is an index of competitiveness. The higher is p or the lower is e, the more 
expensive are domestically produced goods, although the law of one price is not presumed to 
apply in that demand does not grow indefinitely or collapse completely in case e and p are not 
equal to one another. The introduction of the price variable e/p allows the RMSM model to be 
integrated with the financial programming model. 
 
 But, to proceed further, it is necessary to be more specific about B. To allow for steady-
state balanced growth, assume for the moment that there is trade balance when output grows 
at its warranted rate, w, and prices are at world levels. In other words, e=p, B=0 and dy/y = w 
all hold in long-run equilibrium. First, it is crucial to recognise that Khan and Montiel violate 
these assumptions, implicitly precluding the possibility of steady state. For, their balance of 
trade (deficit) function is essentially given by: 
 
 B = B0 - ap/e + by    (3) 
 
 Consequently, as y grows, there is an automatic movement into balance of trade deficit 
unless the real domestic price level, p/e, falls at the same rate for which, of course, long-run 
equilibrium is impossible, since it requires p/e = 1. Once again, this reflects both a short-run 
and pessimistic outlook, in which a trade deficit grows with domestic income. It is as if there 
is no absolutely no potential for export market growth, so that at purchasing power parity, 
p=e, the short-run deficit arising out of growth of domestic income is projected into the long 
run. For steady state, it is necessary to assume that world markets will grow at the same rate 
as the domestic warranted rate of growth. However, it is still possible to retain the short-term 
features that appear to motivate Khan and Montiel. B should be a negative function of p/e, 
equal zero when both p=e and y=y0ewt, and be a positive function of y/y0ewt. Khan and 
Montiel's specification is a negative function of p/e, but does not equal zero at p=e and 
y=y0ewt (so that long-run equilibrium is impossible) and is a positive function of y so that any 
sustained growth inevitably creates a balance of trade deficit. Although the notion that growth 
of exports and the domestic economy must be the same is far from realistic, it is surely 
preferable to precluding growth other than through a balance of trade deficit! A simple 
                                                          
21. This ends the discussion of fiscal balance as it is only referenced in order to illustrate growth pessimism. 
22. There is a presumption here that the saving rate remains the same despite a balance of trade deficit so that the 
latter does not fund consumption at all. 
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suitable functional form for B, that captures the required short-run features with the 
possibility of long-run balance, might be: 
 
 B = Z(p/e)y - X(p/e)y0ewt     (4) 
 
where Z and X are imports and exports, respectively, and Z'>0, X'<0, and Z(1)=X(1) for 
p=e.23 
 
 In short, even to allow for sustainable long-run growth, the model of Khan and Montiel 
has to be modified with equations (2) and (4) replacing (1) and (3), respectively. Otherwise, 
zero is the only possible long-run growth rate.  
 
 From (2) growth depends simply on the resources devoted to investment from saving and 
the balance of trade deficit. The latter, however, has to be covered by an out-flow of reserves, 
R, with the balance of payments account completed by a flow of interest on the difference 
between foreign capital, F, and reserves, and the new in-flow of foreign capital: 
 
 dR = dF - B - i(F-R) 
 
where i is the rate of interest. Rearranging: 
 
 B = dF - dR - i(F-R)   (5) 
 
 From (2) and (5), the RMSM model follows with the growth rate determined by the extent 
to which the balance of trade deficit, B, can be funded by reserves or foreign in-flows: 
 
 Can we assume, as before, that there is balance of trade in the long run? First, p=e from 
purchasing power parity. From the supply-side, if trade does not balance in the long run, the 
growth rate will be shifted by the amount α1B/y. For steady-state, B must equal zero or grow, 
in equilibrium when p=e, at the same rate as y. In this latter case, the growth rate becomes 
w+α1B0/y0, where the zero subscript denotes initial value for a variable growing at constant 
rate. Consequently, a permanent balance of trade deficit at equilibrium prices is consistent 
with steady-state, but is equivalent to an upward shift in the warranted rate of growth. Hence 
g = w + α1B0/y0. Of course, a persisting and growing trade deficit needs to be financed, either 
by an inflow of foreign investment, F, an outflow of foreign reserves, R, or a balancing net 
inflow of interest payments on reserves.  
 
 The exact conditions under which this is possible are laid out in an Appendix 3.24 Whilst 
some might already be convinced that such possibilities are unrealistic in the long run, 
                                                          
23. Recall that any persistent and growing trade deficit has been netted out. Otherwise, it would be possible to set 
Z(1) > X(1). 
24. Note that, for steady state, exports and imports must both grow at the same rate as the economy, even if not 
equal to one another. For, if both grow steadily at different rates, the balance of trade, B, and hence the economy, 
cannot grow steadily. De Pinies (1989) constructs a discrete model of the ratio of net debt to exports by assuming 
that exports and imports grow at different exogenously given rates, together with a given rate of interest. This is not 
consistent with steady-state growth as modeled here. On the assumption that imports and exports do grow at the 
same rate (b=1 in his terminology), the debt to export ratio is unstable when |a|>1 where a is the ratio of one plus the 
rate of interest to one plus the rate of growth of exports, unless certain initial conditions are exactly satisfied. This is 
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especially for developing countries under stabilisation, and because the shift in the growth 
rate and corresponding means of financing it can be netted out for the purposes of examining 
short-run movements around the trend, it will be assumed in what follows that B=0 in long-
run steady-state. Note that, for this case, in long-run equilibrium, then the rate of growth of 
(F-R) is given by i since, with B=0 in equation (5), dF-dR = i(F-R).  
 
 This completes the supply-side of the economy. The following proceeds by inserting these 
modified equations into the remaining elements of their model marriage, by adding the short-
run analysis drawn from financial programming.25 This is in order to examine the relationship 
between the short and long runs. The demand-side, FP model, includes the identity for the 
balance of payments, and the generation of nominal income through the money supply as in 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments. This gives: 
 
 v{(1-θ)p+θe)}y = eR + D   (6) 
 
where v is the inverse of the velocity of circulation, D is domestic credit and θ is the weight 
of importables.26 Through this and the previous equation, the level of reserves adjusts 
according to the balance of payments, and the level of nominal income adjusts according to 
the domestic and international sources of money. 
 
It follows by taking differentials of (6) that: 
 
 edR = vdy{p(1-θ)+θe)} + vy(1-θ)dp - dD  (7) 
 
But, from (5): 
 
 dR = dF - B - i(F-R) 
 
Substituting for R from (6) gives: 
 
  dR = dF - B - (i/e)[eF-v{(1-θ)p+θe}y + D]  (8) 
 
 Eliminating dR between (7) and (8), and re-arranging and collecting terms, this leads to the 
following solution for dp in terms of p and y: 
 
 v(1-θ)dp = v{(1-θ)p+θe}(i-dy/y) + (edF+dD)/y -i(eF+D)/y - eB/y (9) 
 
 In steady-state long-run equilibrium, dy/y = w (or y=y0ewt), B=0, and p=e, and also dp=0. 
Substituting into (9) gives: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
like a special case of the results to be given here in the appendix, with trade given exogenously and independent of 
both output and domestic prices. 
25. See Appendix 1 for the model of financial programming in its pure form. 
 
26. Khan and Montiel take θ to be constant, which presumes a constant proportion of imports to domestic output. 
But if exports, imports and domestic output vary in different directions, as is assumed, for example, for a change in 
relative prices, p/e, then θ should vary also. In other words, θ should reflect a weighted average of the nominal value 




 ev(i-w) + (edF+dD)/y0ewt -i(eF+D)/y0ewt = 0 
 
 This is a differential equation in M=eF+D, that part of the money supply made up of 
foreign capital and domestic currency, leaving aside own reserves R. Whilst the first 
component, eF, might be thought to be subject to uncertainty, the second can be controlled. In 
other words, the economy can be sustained in steady-state balanced growth by setting M 
according to: 
 
 v(i-w) + (dM-iM)/y0ewt = 0 
 
 The solution is given, for some constant A0, by:27 
 
 M = A0eit + y0evewt    (10) 
 
 This rule for M will keep the economy in long-run equilibrium. It allows for two 
components of the money supply, one to grow at the rate of interest (to keep up with debt 
payments), and one to grow with the economy to allow for transactions.28 
 
 Now, although the rule for M given by (10) sustains equilibrium, it is not necessarily the 
policy to be adopted out of equilibrium. However, on the basis of uncertainty over foreign 
flows and in order to examine stability properties of the model, assume that the money supply 
rule given by (10) is adopted. Substituting (10) in (9) yields: 
 
 v(1-θ)dp = v{(1-θ)p+θe}(i-dy/y) + M0ewt(w-i)/y - eB/y 
 
 But, from the supply-side, given by equation (2), substituting for dy/y yields: 
 
 v(1-θ)dp = (w-i){M0ewt/y - v[(1-θ)p+θe]} - eB/y{1 + α1v[(1-θ)p+θe]/p} (11) 
 
 Consider now the adjustment of p and y over time from equations (2) and (11). For the 
case where w=i, the first term on the RHS of equation (11) for dp drops out, and both p and y 
can only take on their equilibrium values when B=0, see also equation (2). When B>0, y 
exceeds its warranted growth rate, w, and p decreases, and vice-versa for B<0. Figure 1 shows 
that the equilibrium, y/y0ewt = 1 and p=e, is unstable. The locus of B=0 is negatively sloped 
(trade balance with too high y if too low p/e). As the only point at which the adjustment over 
time can cut the B=0 curve is at full equilibrium itself, it can be shown that there is no such 
path to equilibrium. With a balance of trade deficit, y grows too fast and, although p falls, the 
trade deficit persists because of the effect of too rapid output growth.  
 
 For the case where w=/ i, equation (11) becomes: 
 
 v(1-θ)dp = (w-i){evy0ewt/y - v[(1-θ)p+θe]} - eB/y{1 + α1v[(1-θ)p+θe]/p}  
                                                          
27. A0 is clearly given by D0+eF0-y0ev. 
28. The final component in the money supply as a whole is reserves, R, and interest paid on them. Note that, if A0 is 
negative and i>w, M will eventually grow negatively large. This needs to be ruled out unless R0>A0. Then, interest 
on reserves is coming in fast enough to counter falls in other sources of money. 
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 For w>i, consider the locus of dp=0. When p and y are both above their equilibrium 
values, both -B and the first term on the RHS of the above equation are negative. It follows 
that one of these variables must be above and one below its equilibrium value for dp=0. More 
generally, for plausible functional forms for B, it can be shown that the locus of dp=0 lies 
above, is steeper than, the curve B=0 or where y takes on its equilibrium value. The phase 
diagram for this situation is shown in figure 2. Once again, the equilibrium is unstable but, in 
this case, it contains a saddle-point with a single path to equilibrium.  
 
 This can be illustrated as follows. Recall from (5) that, in long-run equilibrium, F-R grows 
at the rate i, but that M = A0eit + y0evewt grows at the rate w. If, for convenience it is assumed 
that both F and D grow at the rate w, then R=R0eit + F0(ewt-eit). As w>i, R also grows, even if 
asymptotically, at the rate w. If there is an initial balance of trade deficit, B>0, and the price 
level is too high but the initial growth rate too low (to the south-east of equilibrium), then this 
implies that the initial level of reserves, R, is too high for equilibrium. With the trade deficit, 
B, allowing the growth rate to increase to its equilibrium level, it may just be sufficient to off-
set the natural growth in reserves, given by w>i, and hit the appropriate proportions of R and 
M at the equilibrium. Otherwise, there is instability. 
 
 Now consider the case where i>w. This renders ambiguous the slope of the locus of dp=0, 
although it is plausibly less steep than for w=i. It can even be positively sloped. It implies that 
the equilibrium has a saddle-point, with one path to equilibrium, the model otherwise being 
unstable, figure 3. Thus, although there are interest rates higher than the growth rate, this can 
be stabilising should the natural run-down of reserves, on debt payment for F for i>w, once 
again fortuitously place monetary stocks in the right proportions with the passage of time. 
 
 The two cases for which i=/ w now explain why equilibrium is unstable without saddle-
point for i=w. For, in this case, the ratio of reserves R to money supply component M cannot 
adjust even by chance to equilibrium proportions, since the adjustment can only be made 
through the difference between i and w. 
 
 The results of the analysis can be briefly summarised. First, despite claims to the contrary, 
the merged model proposed by Khan and Montiel does not combine the short and long runs to 
provide a theory of growth and adjustment. Second, this is because long run, stable growth is 
precluded in their own version of the marriage. Third, the resulting pre-occupation with the 
short run is unduly pessimistic with the scope for adjustment (through policy-inspired 
parameter shifts in factor productivity and balance of trade, for example) being unscaled 
relative to output and, hence, increasingly limited automatically as growth occurs. Fourth, if 
the model is amended to allow for the possibility of steady-state balanced growth, it generally 
leads to unstable outcomes unless holdings of foreign reserves start or adjust by chance to the 
right proportions, or unless the monetary authority has the capacity both to identify the long-
run growth path and to adjust to it directly. Finally, this implies that the table of results 
produced by Khan and Montiel, connecting shifts in exogenous and policy variables to 
adjustment in one period, are either totally meaningless or totally unnecessary. In case of 
imperfect monetary policy and instability, first period shifts do not necessarily indicate 
subsequent direction of neither movement nor changes in the underlying growth path, if any. 




 Thus, the model presented by Khan and Montiel does not satisfactorily address the long 
run. It is worth recalling the economic assumptions on which it is based which tend to be 
obscured by the complexity of the algebra and their being mingled with accounting identities.  
There are saving, demand for money, production and balance of trade functions, all of which 
are extremely simple. It hardly seems that an apposite model of the long run could emerge 
from such a simple framework, let alone address the short run and the articulation between 
the two. It is totally incapable of addressing the fundamental policy issues of how to generate 
productivity increases and sustain international competitiveness. How the corresponding 
causal factors are situated relative to the short and long run is also necessarily absent. Further, 
as in all steady-state, long-run growth models, shift in the composition of output to reflect 
modernisation, industrialisation, or whatever, is inevitably absent even though this is the one 
concession that Agenor and Montiel (1996) make in constructing a specifically development 
macroeconomics, on which see below. Presumably, such sectoral and socio-economic 
transitions can be left to microeconomics and market forces. 
 
 
APPENDIX 3: STEADY-STATE GROWTH WITH  
A GROWING BALANCE OF TRADE DEFICIT 
 
 In long-run steady-state growth with a persistent trade deficit growing at rate g so that 
B=B0egt that: 
 
 g = w + α1B0/y0 
 
 For dp=0 and p=e in long-run equilibrium, from equation (9), equilibrium for M is given 
by:  
 
 y0ev(i-g)egt + dM -iM - eB0egt = 0 
 
 Hence, as long as g=/ i: 
 
 M = A0eit + (y0ev + eB0/{g-i})egt 
 
 This is a generalisation of the previous result, equivalent to a shift in y0ev by the amount 
eB0/{g-i}, so that the analysis goes through as before. For the exceptional case, g=i, the 
equation for M becomes: 
 
 dM - gM - eB0egt = 0 
 
This has solution, M = (M0+eB0t)egt. Without going into details, when this is substituted 
back into the short-run equations, whether there is stability or not is ambiguous, depending 
upon the elasticity of the balance of trade with respect to prices. This is hardly surprising as a 
simpler model, such as that of the J-curve, would create perverse effects if balance of 
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